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Abstract
The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the elec-
torate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural
to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the electorate and their counts, i.e.,
high-multiplicity representation. We consider how this representation affects the complexity of
election problems. High-multiplicity representation may be exponentially smaller than stan-
dard representation, and so many polynomial-time algorithms for election problems in standard
representation become exponential-time. Surprisingly, for polynomial-time election problems,
we are often able to either adapt the same approach or provide new algorithms to show that
these problems remain polynomial-time in the high-multiplicity case; this is in sharp contrast
to the case where each voter has a weight, where the complexity usually increases. In the
process we explore the relationship between high-multiplicity scheduling and manipulation of
high-multiplicity elections. And we show that for any fixed set of job lengths, high-multiplicity
scheduling on uniform parallel machines is in P, which was previously known for only two job
lengths. We did not find any natural case where a polynomial-time election problem does not
remain in P when moving to high-multiplicity representation. However, we found one natural
NP-hard election problem where the complexity does increase, namely winner determination for
Kemeny elections.
1 Introduction
Elections are an important and widely used tool for determining an outcome given the preferences
of several agents (see, e.g., [BCE+16]). In most of the computational studies on elections, the
preferences of the voters are represented as a list of votes. Though this may be a reasonable
representation for paper ballots in political elections, in artificial intelligence applications a more
succinct representation where the preferences of the electorate are represented as a list of distinct
votes and their counts may be more natural. For example, this representation is used by the online
preference repository PrefLib for election data [MW13]. Following terminology from scheduling
introduced by Hochbaum and Shamir [HS91] we refer to this as high-multiplicity representation.
We consider how high-multiplicity representation can affect the complexity of different election
problems, and contrast this with the case of weighted voters.
∗The conference version of this paper [FH18] appears in the Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
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High-multiplicity representation may be exponentially smaller than standard representation,
and so many polynomial-time algorithms for election problems in standard representation become
exponential-time. Surprisingly, we find that the complexity of polynomial-time election problems
generally remains in P. We explain this phenomenon by showing that many common proof tech-
niques that show that election problems are in P can be adapted to the high-multiplicity case (see
Section 3).
We also explore the relationship between the well-studied problem of high-multiplicity scheduling
and high-multiplicity election manipulation (see Section 4). In the process, we show that for any
fixed set of job lengths, high-multiplicity scheduling on uniform parallel machines (this is the case
where different machines can have different speeds) is in P (Theorem 5). Previous work showed that
for two job lengths, high-multiplicity scheduling on uniform parallel machines is in P [MSS01], and
very recent work shows that for any fixed number of job lengths, high-multiplicity scheduling on
identical parallel machines (basically bin packing) is in P [GR14].
In general, we find that the complexity of polynomial-time election problems in standard represen-
tation does not increase when moving to the high-multiplicity case. This is in line with related work
that includes results for high-multiplicity elections (there simply called succinct elections), which
does not include any case where the complexity increases [FHH09, FHHR09, FHHR11, HHR09,
Rus07]. And this general behavior is also found in the literature on high-multiplicity scheduling.
For example, with respect to scheduling, Clifford and Posner [CP01] states: “. . . we do not know
of a problem that can be solved in polynomial time, under standard encoding, yet is NP-complete
under HM encoding.”
However, this does not mean that it is not possible for the complexity to increase. For example,
consider the following election system ExactlyHalfApproval. Every voter votes by an approval vector
(i.e., states an approval or disapproval for each candidate), and a candidate is a winner if they
receive exactly half of all approvals. Though simple, this election system is not particularly natural.
It has been chosen to show that an increase in complexity is possible. Consider the problem of
constructive control by adding candidates (CCAC) for election system ExactlyHalfApproval. Given
an election in high-multiplicity representation, a set of unregistered candidates, and a preferred
candidate p, it is NP-complete to determine whether p can be made a winner of the election using
system ExactlyHalfApproval by adding unregistered candidates to the election. This is because
this problem is basically subset sum, which is in P for unary numbers by dynamic programming
and is NP-complete for binary numbers [GJ79]. (See Theorem 11 for a straightforward proof of
this example. Also, we mention in passing that ExactlyHalfApproval-Weighted-CCAC is also NP-
complete.)
We did find a natural case where the complexity increases, but for an NP-hard election problem.
We find that determining the winner of a Kemeny election, which is well-known to be Θp2-complete
for standard representation [HSV05], is ∆p2-complete for high-multiplicity representation. This solves
an open problem from the previous work by Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel [HSV05]. (See
Section 6.)
2 Preliminaries
An election (in standard representation) is defined as a finite set of candidates C, and a list of voters
V , where each voter v ∈ V is specified by their preference order over the candidates. In high-
multiplicity representation, V is not a list of voters, but instead a list of distinct votes v (preference
orders) and their positive integer counts κ(v). To see how these two definitions compare, consider
the election that in standard representation consists of C = {a, b, c} and the following four voters:
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(a > b > c), (a > b > c), (a > b > c), and (b > c > a). This list of four voters in high-multiplicity
representation is: 3× (a > b > c) and 1× (b > c > a).
We will compare complexity results between high-multiplicity and weighted election problems.
In a weighted election, V is still a list of voters, but now each v ∈ V has an associated positive
integer weight ω(v), and can be thought of as a coalition of ω(v) voters all voting the same. It is
important to note that weights are indivisible, while the counts in high-multiplicity representation
are not.1 We assume that the preference order of each voter is a total order, i.e., he or she strictly
ranks each candidate from most to least preferred.
An election system E maps an election to a set of winners, where the winners can be any subset
of the candidate set. (This is known as the nonunique winner model.) The problem E-Winner is
defined below.
Name: E-Winner
Given: An election (C, V ) and a candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is p a winner of (C, V ) using election system E?
In the high-multiplicity case, E-High-Multiplicity-Winner, we use high-multiplicity representation
for V , and in the weighted case, E-Weighted-Winner, each voter has a corresponding positive integer
weight.
A scoring vector 〈α1, α2, . . . , αm〉, αi ≥ αi+1, defines an election system overm candidates. Each
candidate receives αi points for each vote where they are ranked ith, and the candidate(s) with the
highest score win.
A (polynomial-time uniform) pure scoring rule defines a family of scoring vectors where the m-
candidate scoring vector can be computed in polynomial time inm, and the (m+1)-candidate scoring
vector can be obtained from the m-candidate scoring vector by adding a single coefficient [BD10].
2.1 Manipulative Actions
We examine the complexity of the following manipulative actions on elections. For each problem, we
present the definition for the standard representation, and describe how the high-multiplicity and
weighted cases differ.
Manipulation is the most widely studied manipulative action on elections. The computational
study of manipulation was introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89], and was later ex-
tended for the coalitional, destructive, and weighted cases by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07].
We present the definition of constructive unweighted coalitional manipulation (CUCM) below.
Name: E-CUCM
Given: A set of candidates C, a list of nonmanipulative voters V1, a list of k manipulators V2,
2 and
a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Is there a way to set the preferences of the manipulators so that p is a winner of the
election (C, V1 ∪ V2) using election system E?
1Xia, Conitzer, and Procaccia [XCP10] have a notion of “divisible” weights, but they allow noninteger divisions
and so this is very different from high-multiplicity. It is interesting that their paper reduces manipulation for this
notion to a scheduling problem, though a different scheduling problem than what we use.
2This can also be thought of as specifying the number of manipulators, k, in unary.
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The weighted case (CWCM) is essentially the same as above, except each of the voters (both
the nonmanipulators and the manipulators) have an associated positive integer weight. In the
corresponding high-multiplicity case, we use high-multiplicity representation for the nonmanipulators
as well as for the manipulators, which are represented as k encoded in binary.
Electoral control denotes the family of manipulative actions that consider an agent with control
over the structure of the election, called the election chair, who wants to ensure his or her preferred
outcome [BTT92]. Below we define constructive control by adding voters (CCAV), which is a very
natural case of control and can be thought of as modeling get-out-the-vote drives.
Name: E-CCAV
Given: A set of candidates C, a list of registered voters V , a list of unregistered voters U , an add
limit k ∈ N, and a preferred candidate p ∈ C.
Question: Does there exist a list U ′ of unregistered voters U ′ ⊆ U such that U ′ consists of at most
k unregistered voters and p is a winner of (C, V ∪ U ′) using election system E?
In the standard model of weighted voter control the parameter k denotes the number of weighted
voters the chair can add/delete [FHH15]. In the high-multiplicity case, the only change from the
E-CCAV definition above is that we use high-multiplicity representation for both lists of voters.
2.2 Computational Complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with the complexity classes P and NP. We also have results
concerning the complexity classes Θp2 and ∆
p
2. ∆
p
2 denotes the class of problems solvable in P with
access to an NP oracle. Θp2 is a subset of ∆
p
2, where the P-machine can ask a log number of queries
to an NP oracle (which is equivalent to the class of problems solvable by a P-machine that can ask
one round of parallel queries to an NP oracle [Hem89]).
Most of our polynomial-time results for high-multiplicity problems modify the proof of the prob-
lem in standard representation, but some results will use the well-known result due to Lenstra,
which shows that even though solving an integer linear program is NP-complete in the general
case [Kar72, BT76], it is in P when the number of variables is fixed [Len83]. Informally, an integer
linear program is a system of linear inequalities with integer variables and coefficients.
3 Adapting Approaches
The general theme of this paper is that even though we would expect the complexity of election
problems to increase (with respect to the length of the input) when using high-multiplicity repre-
sentation, we find that in general such increases do not occur. In this section we will discuss several
common approaches used to show that election problems are in P (in standard representation), and
describe how they can be adapted for high-multiplicity representation, sometimes straightforwardly
and sometimes in a more complicated way.
In particular, we show how greedy approaches, limited brute-forcing, network flow, and edge
matching/cover techniques can be adapted. To showcase these adaptations, we will show that the
dichotomy result for constructive control by adding voters (CCAV) for pure scoring rules [HHS14a]
holds for the high-multiplicity case.
Assuming P 6= NP, the following pure scoring rules are asymptotically (i.e., for a large enough
number of candidates) the only cases where CCAV is in P, both for standard and high-multiplicity
representation.
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• 〈α, β, 0, . . . , 0〉, where α > β.
• t-Approval: 〈1t, 0, . . . , 0〉, where t ≤ 3.
• t-Veto: 〈1, . . . , 1, 0t〉, where t ≤ 2.
• 〈2, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉.
In contrast, all weighted cases are NP-complete, except triviality (i.e., a scoring rule where every
candidate scores the same), 1-approval (plurality), 2-approval, and 1-veto [FHH15, Lin12].
The following is a case where we need to adapt a greedy approach as well as to handle limited
brute-forcing.
Theorem 1 For α > β ≥ 0, 〈α, β, 0, . . . , 0〉-CCAV is in P for high-multiplicity elections.
Proof. We follow the proof of the claim from [HHS14a], which is found in its corresponding
technical report [HHS14b], and show how to adapt this to the high-multiplicity case.
The proof shows that there is a constant ℓ such that it is never better to add ℓ votes that put p
second than it is to add ℓ different votes that put p first (assuming that votes that rank the first two
candidates identically also rank all other candidates identically). Let V1 be the set of unregistered
voters that put p first and let V2 be the set of unregistered voters that put p second.
So, if p can be made a winner, p can be made a winner by adding at most ℓ − 1 voters from V2
or in a way that does not leave ℓ different votes in V1 unused.
In the first case, we can brute-force over all sets of V2 voters of size < ℓ (since ℓ is a constant).
Add these voters. We are then left with the problem of checking whether we can add at most k′ V1
voters to an election to make p a winner, where k′ is k minus the number of V2 voters added. In
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [HHS14a], this is done by brute-forcing over every j
in {0, . . . , k′} and checking whether we can add j voters from V1 to make p a winner. If we know
j, we know what the score of p after control will be, and so the last part can then be done greedily
by, for each candidate a, adding as many voters that put a second as possible one voter at the time
(until we have added j voters total).
We have two problems in the high-multiplicity case. The first is that we cannot in polynomial
time brute-force over all possible values of j, since k′ is not polynomially bounded. The second
problem is that we don’t have the time to add voters one at the time. The second problem can of
course easily be fixed by, for each candidate a, adding as many voters with a in second place as
possible all at once: If sa is the initial score of a and fsp is the final score of p (note that fsp = sp+jα),
we can add at most ⌊(fsp − sa)/β⌋ voters with a second.
To handle the first problem, note that we can formulate the problem as an integer linear program
with one variable (j), namely there is a j, 0 ≤ j ≤ k′, such that
∑
a∈C−{p}
min(⌊(sp + jα− sa)/β⌋, va) ≥ j,
where va is the number of voters in V1 that rank a second.
3 This integer linear program can be
solved in polynomial time by Lenstra [Len83].
It remains to show that the second case, where p can be made a winner in a way that does not
leave ℓ different votes in V1 unused, can be determined in polynomial time in the high-multiplicity
case.
3Notice that the ILP above checks that if we add the maximum number of voters such that the score of each of
the non-p candidates is at most sp + jα, then we have added at least j voters. This implies that we can add j voters
in such a way that p is still a winner.
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For the standard case, in Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Schnoor [HHS14a] this case is
handled by brute-forcing over all sets S of at most ℓ − 1 candidates who are ranked second by
unused V1 voters, and then brute-forcing over all possible sets of unused V1 voters consistent with S.
We can describe a set of voters consistent with S as a function u : S → {1, . . . , ‖V1‖} such that u(c)
is the number of unused V1 voters that rank c second. We can brute-force over all such functions
u in polynomial time. This way, we loop over all possible sets of unused V1 voters, and so we also
loop over all possible sets of added V1 voters. After adding the V1 voters, we need to see if p can be
made a winner by adding V2 voters. This can be done in a similar way as adding the V1 voters in
the first case above.
In the high-multiplicity case, we can still loop over all sets S of at most ℓ − 1 candidates. We
can not brute-force all functions u, but this will turn again into an integer linear program, this time
with ℓ − 1 variables (for the u values) and one more variable to handle the V2 voters similarly to
how we handled the V1 voters in the first case above. This integer linear program can be solved in
polynomial time by Lenstra [Len83]. ❑
We now show how edge matching/cover techniques can be adapted.
Theorem 2 CCAV is in P for t-approval when t ≤ 3 and for t-veto when t ≤ 2 for high-multiplicity
elections.
Proof. The results for 1-approval, 2-approval, and 1-veto follow via simple greedy algorithms that
can easily be adapted to work in the high-multiplicity case.
3-approval-CCAV was shown to be in P by Lin [Lin12] using a reduction to Simple b-Edge
Matching for Multigraphs (see [Sch03]). The essence of the reduction is that every unregistered
voter of the form ({p, x, y} > · · · ) (by which we mean a voter who gives a point to p, x, and y)
corresponds to an edge (x, y) in the constructed multigraph. For every candidate c 6= p, c is a vertex
in the graph and b(c) is the final score of p minus the initial score of c (i.e., the number of points that
we can add to c while keeping c’s score less than or equal to p’s score). In the high-multiplicity case,
we would have too many edges in the graph. However, Capacitated b-Edge Matching (for graphs
where edges have integer capacities) is also in P (see [Sch03]). So, we simply set the capacity of edge
(x, y) equal to the number of unregistered voters of the form ({p, x, y} > · · · ), and we let b(c) be the
final score of p minus the initial score of c as previously.
Similarly, 2-veto-CCAV was shown to be in P by reduction to Simple b-Edge Cover for Multi-
graphs. In that reduction, every unregistered voter of the form (· · · > {x, y}) corresponds to an
edge (x, y) in the constructed multigraph. Again, we can modify this construction to a reduction to
Capacitated b-Edge Cover, which is also in P, by letting the capacity of edge (x, y) be the number
of unregistered voters of the form (· · · > {x, y}). ❑
Another common technique to show that election problems are in P is network flow.
Theorem 3 〈2, 1, . . . , 1, 0〉-CCAV is in P for high-multiplicity elections.
Proof. The essence of the standard representation proof is to (after some easy preprocessing)
build a min-cost flow network. The capacities of the edges are the scores of the candidates from
the registered voters and the multiplicities of the votes of the unregistered voters. In the high-
multiplicity case, we can use the exact same network. The capacities are now binary integers, but
min-cost network flow is still in P in that case. ❑
Dynamic Programming There is one other common technique that is used to prove that election
problems are in P. This is dynamic programming. As alluded to in the introduction, dynamic
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programming approaches do not generalize to the high-multiplicity case. Let’s for example look
at the result by Hemaspaandra and Schnoor [HS16b] that shows that for all pure scoring rules
with a constant number of different coefficients, manipulation is in P. This is shown by dynamic
programming. And this algorithm is not in P for the high-multiplicity case, not even for very
restricted versions of this problem. In the next section we consider a different approach to this
problem using scheduling.
4 Manipulation as Scheduling
We now turn to the problem of manipulation for high-multiplicity elections for pure scoring rules.
What does our election manipulation problem have to do with scheduling? As an example, consider
scoring rule 〈4, 3, 3, 2, 0, . . . , 0〉 and let {p, c1, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates. Let sc be the score
of candidate c from the nonmanipulators, and let k be the number of manipulators. Note that we
can assume that all manipulators rank p first, so that p’s final score is sp + 4k. We need to see
if we can set the manipulators such that every candidate c 6= p scores at most sp + 4k. As also
pointed out in Bachrach et al. [BLLZ16] for the case without nonmanipulators, we can view this as
the following scheduling problem: We have 2k jobs of length 3 and k jobs of length 2, we have m
machines, machine i corresponds to candidate ci, and machine i has deadline sp + 4k − sci . It is
easy to see that if p can be made a winner, then we can schedule the jobs such that every machine
meets its deadline. However, we note that the converse does not hold: We need to make sure that
every machine has at most k jobs scheduled on it. We also need to be careful that every voter ranks
each candidate exactly once. The construction from Hemaspaandra and Schnoor [HS16a] shows
that there is a successful manipulation if and only if there is a successful schedule such that each
machine has at most k jobs scheduled on it. Note that this also gives the obvious equivalence for
the corresponding high-multiplicity versions of these problems.
More generally, we can state the following equivalence, which is implicit in the work by
Hemaspaandra and Schnoor [HS16a], which shows that manipulation is in P for all pure scoring
rules with a constant number of different coefficients in standard representation.
Theorem 4 Let 〈α0, α
m1
1 , α
m2
2 , . . . , α
mC
C , 0
mC+1〉 be a scoring rule such that α0 ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · >
αC > 0 and m1, . . . ,mC+1 are positive integers such that m1 + · · · + mC+1 = m. Let the set of
candidates be {p, c1, . . . , cm} and let there be k manipulators.
Then p can be made a winner if and only if for 1 ≤ j ≤ C, we can schedule kmj jobs of length
αj on m machines such that the ith machine has deadline sp + α0k − sci with the additional
restriction that we schedule at most k jobs per machine.
Since our problem is closely related to scheduling and since high-multiplicity scheduling has been
well-studied, it makes sense to see what is known there, so that we can see how easy or hard these
problems are and so that we can try to adapt the results.
First some terminology. It is easy to see that scheduling with machine-dependent deadlines
is equivalent to the well-known scheduling problem called scheduling on uniform parallel ma-
chines (where different machines can have different speeds) [MSS01]. In the high-multiplicity
version of the scheduling with machine-dependent deadlines problem, the input is given as
ℓ1, . . . , ℓC , n1, . . . , nC , D1, . . . , Dm, meaning that there are ni jobs of length ℓi, and m machines with
deadlines D1, . . . , Dm. If all deadlines are the same, the problem is equivalent to scheduling on iden-
tical parallel machines (this problem is also known as bin packing and as the cutting-stock problem).
In the high-multiplicity version of that problem, the input is given as ℓ1, . . . , ℓC , n1, . . . , nC ,m,D
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(note that this makes the input even more succinct, and so a polynomial-time algorithm for schedul-
ing with machine-dependent deadlines does not necessarily imply a polynomial-time algorithm for
the same problem where all machines have the same deadline).
In many contexts, the number of job lengths or item types is small and so high-multiplicity
scheduling for a constant number of item types is an important problem. Surprisingly, the com-
plexity of this problem was open for a long time. Leung [Leu82] first studied this problem and
provided a pseudopolynomial algorithm for the case where all machines have the same deadline that
is polynomial in the length of the input and the number of items. Only in 2001 was this determined
to be in P for two job lengths, both in the case where all machines have the same deadline as well
as the case with machine-dependent deadlines [MSS01]. The case for any constant number of job
lengths was only very recently shown to be in P for the case where all machines have the same
deadline [GR14]. However, the algorithm from [GR14] does not give a polynomial-time result for
the case of machine-dependent deadlines.
Given all this, do we have any chance of solving our high-multiplicity manipulation problems?
There are some glimmers of hope. The first one is that the restriction to having at most k jobs per
machine could make the problem easier (it could also make it harder of course). Secondly, we know
that the number of jobs of each length is a multiple of k (this could make the problem simpler).
Finally, we can take ℓ1, . . . , ℓC to be constant, since for a pure scoring rule with a constant number
of different coefficients, there are only a fixed number of coefficients that occur for any number of
candidates, and by Theorem 4, the occurring coefficients are exactly the occurring job lengths. We
will first show that for every fixed C, ℓ1, . . . , ℓC , high-multiplicity scheduling with machine-dependent
deadlines (and thus also high-multiplicity scheduling on uniform parallel machines) is in P. Note that
this is a very natural problem, since in many contexts, the set of job lengths or item types is fixed.
So this is a very interesting result in its own right.
Theorem 5 For any fixed set of job lengths, high-multiplicity scheduling on uniform parallel ma-
chines is in P.
Proof. Let C be the number of job lengths and let ℓ1, . . . , ℓC be these job lengths. As men-
tioned previously, high-multiplicity scheduling on uniform parallel machines is equivalent to high-
multiplicity scheduling on machines with machine-dependent deadlines [MSS01], and this is the
problem that we will show to be in P.
Given n1, . . . , nC , where ni is the number of jobs of length ℓi, and D1, . . . , Dm, where Di is the
deadline for machine i, we can solve our scheduling problem in polynomial time, and pretty easily
at that.
Example Case. We will first explain the core argument by looking at C = 2, ℓ1 = 2, and ℓ2 = 3
and after that we will explain how the argument generalizes. So, we have n1 jobs of length 2, n2
jobs of length 3, and m machines with deadlines D1, . . . , Dm. And the question is whether there
exist nonnegative integers xi (the number of jobs of length 2 scheduled on machine i) and yi (the
number of jobs of length 3 scheduled on machine i) such that 2xi + 3yi ≤ Di,
∑m
i=1 xi = n1, and∑m
i=1 yi = n2.
Consider the ith machine. We can group the jobs as “sixes,” by which we mean 3 jobs of length
2 or 2 jobs of length 3, and “the leftovers,” which consist of 0, 1, or 2 jobs of length 2 and 0 or 1
jobs of length 3. Note that the sum of the leftovers is at most 7.
Let D′i be the largest integer that is ≤ Di− 7 and divisible by 6. Then D
′
i time can be scheduled
with just sixes and no leftovers. And so we can schedule successfully if and only if there exist
a1 jobs of length 2 and a2 jobs of length 3 that can be scheduled on m machines with deadlines
D1−D′1, D2−D
′
2, . . . , Dm−D
′
m such that the remaining (n1−a1) jobs of length 2 and the remaining
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(n2 − a2) jobs of length 3 can be scheduled on m machines with deadlines D′1, . . . , D
′
m in sixes, i.e.,
as groups of 3 jobs of length 2 and groups of 2 jobs of length 3.
Why is this in P? Note that Di − D′i ≤ 12, since D
′
i is the largest integer that is ≤ Di − 7
and divisible by 6, and so a1 ≤ 6m and a2 ≤ 4m, and we can use dynamic programming to
compute all values of a1 and a2 such that a1 jobs of length 2 and a2 jobs of length 3 fit into
D1 − D′1, D2 − D
′
2, . . . , Dm − D
′
m. Finally, check that n1 − a1 is divisible by 3, that n2 − a2 is
divisible by 2, and that (n1 − a1)/3 + (n2 − a2)/2 ≤ (D′1 + · · ·+D
′
m)/6.
This takes time O(m3 logn), where n is the number of jobs. For the dynamic programming
simply let, for all a1 ≤ 6m, a2 ≤ 4m, and m̂ ≤ m, T [a1, a2, m̂] = 1 if and only if a1 jobs of length 2
and a2 jobs of length 3 fit into D1−D′1, D2−D
′
2, . . . , Dm̂−D
′
m̂. There are O(m
3) values to compute
and it takes O(log n) to compute one value, since all numbers involved are length O(log n) and there
are a constant number of ways to fit jobs into Di −D′i (since Di −D
′
i ≤ 12).
General Case. It is easy to see how the approach for the example case generalizes to the case for
each fixed set of job lengths ℓ1, . . . , ℓC . Let ℓ = lcm(ℓ1, . . . , ℓC). Our input is n1, . . . , nC , D1, . . . , Dm.
Consider the ith machine. We can group the jobs as “ℓs,” by which we mean ℓ/ℓj jobs of length ℓj
for some j, and “the leftovers,” which consist of < ℓ/ℓj jobs of length ℓj for each j. Note that the
sum of the leftovers is at most
∑C
j=1(ℓ/ℓj − 1)ℓj =
∑C
j=1(ℓ− ℓj).
For each i, let D′i be the largest integer that is ≤ Di −
∑C
j=1(ℓ − ℓj) and divisible by ℓ. Then
D′i time can be scheduled with just ℓs and no leftovers. And so we can schedule successfully if and
only if there exist aj jobs of length ℓj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ C, that can be scheduled on m machines with
deadlines D1 −D′1, D2 −D
′
2, . . . , Dm −D
′
m such that all remaining (nj − aj) jobs of length ℓj , for
1 ≤ j ≤ C, can be scheduled on m machines with deadlines D′1, . . . , D
′
m in ℓs, i.e., as groups of ℓ/ℓj
jobs of length ℓj.
Why is this in P? Note that Di − D
′
i ≤
∑C
j=1(ℓ − ℓj) + ℓ − 1, since D
′
i is the largest integer
that is ≤ Di −
∑C
j=1(ℓ − ℓj) and divisible by ℓ. Since C and ℓ1, . . . , ℓC are fixed, aj = O(m) and
we can use dynamic programming to compute all values of a1, . . . , aC such that aj jobs of length
ℓj fit into D1 −D′1, D2 −D
′
2, . . . , Dm −D
′
m. Finally, check that nj − aj is divisible by ℓj and that∑C
j=1(nj − aj)/ℓj ≤ (D
′
1 + · · ·+D
′
m)/ℓ.
Note that since the ℓis and C are constant, the argument provided for the example case also
shows that the general case is in P. ❑
Note that the above does not give a polynomial-time algorithm if only C is fixed and ℓ1, . . . , ℓC
are given as part of the input. And so the above does not imply the result that for two job lengths,
high-multiplicity scheduling with machine-dependent deadlines is in P from McCormick, Smallwood,
and Spieksma [MSS01].
However, as mentioned previously, the case where ℓ1, . . . , ℓC are fixed is very natural, and so this
is an interesting result for scheduling. But recall from Theorem 4 that to solve manipulation, we
in addition have to ensure that there are at most k jobs scheduled on each machine. As mentioned
earlier, such a restriction can potentially make the complexity harder (as well as easier).
What are the problems with adding the restriction that we have at most k jobs per machine in
the argument of the proof of Theorem 5? Let’s look at the C = 2, ℓ1 = 2, ℓ2 = 3 case. In the case
without the restriction that we have at most k jobs per machine, all deadlines with the same value
mod 6 are treated the same, and every “six” is treated the same (no matter what machine it’s on).
This is no longer the case if we also require that every machine handles at most k jobs, since it then
matters if you schedule three jobs of length 2 or two jobs of length 3 in a six.
However, we can show a number of high-multiplicity manipulation cases to be in P using schedul-
ing, which is in contrast to the weighted case where only triviality and plurality are in P. Note that
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the theorem below does not cover all of the polynomial-time cases of manipulation for pure scor-
ing rules in standard representation, since for example, we do not cover 〈2m/3, 1m/3, 0m/3〉 (though
cases with at most two different coefficients can be handled easily). Also note that there is a limit
to how far this can be generalized, since even in standard representation manipulation for Borda is
NP-complete [BNW11, DKNW11].
Theorem 6 Let α0 ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · > αC > 0. Manipulation for pure scoring rule
〈α0, α
m1
1 , α
m2
2 , . . . , α
mC
C , 0
m−(m1+···+mC)〉 is in P for high-multiplicity elections.
Proof. By Theorem 4, it suffices to show that the following problem is in P: Given k,D1, . . . , Dm,
can we schedule kmj jobs of length αj on m machines with deadlines D1, . . . , Dm such that every
machine meets its deadline and such that there are at most k jobs scheduled on each machine.
Example Case. We first explain the core argument for C = 2, α1 = 3, α2 = 2, m1 = 1, m2 = 1.
So, we are given k,D1, . . . , Dm, and we are asking whether we can we schedule k jobs of length 2
and k jobs of length 3 on m machines with deadlines D1, . . . , Dm such that every machine meets
its deadline and such that there are at most k jobs scheduled on each machine. That is, we are
asking whether there exist nonnegative integers xi (the number of jobs of length 2 scheduled on
machine i) and yi (the number of jobs of length 3 scheduled on machine i) such that 2xi+3yi ≤ Di,∑m
i=1 xi = k,
∑m
i=1 yi = k, and xi + yi ≤ k.
Note that we can assume that Di ≤ 3k. Also note that if Di ≤ 2k, our new requirement that
machine i has at most k jobs, i.e., xi+ yi ≤ k, follows from the old requirement that 2xi+3yi ≤ Di.
If Di ≤ 2k for all i, then we can solve our problem by using the algorithm from Theorem 5. If
there are more than two machines with deadline > 2k, we can schedule k jobs of length 2 on machine
1, ⌈k/2⌉ jobs of length 3 on machine 2, and ⌊k/2⌋ jobs of length 3 on machine 3.
It remains therefore to look at the case where there are one or two machines with deadline > 2k.
Without loss of generality, assume that the deadlines are in nonincreasing order and that we have
at least two machines. Then our case is solvable if and only if there exist x1, y1, x2, y2 such that
2x1 + 3y1 ≤ D1, 2x2 + 3y2 ≤ D2, x1 + y1 ≤ k, and x2 + y2 ≤ k, such that k− x1 − x2 jobs of length
2 and k − y1 − y2 jobs of length 3 can be scheduled on m− 2 machines with deadlines D3, . . . , Dm
(since all these deadlines are ≤ 2k, the requirement that we schedule at most k jobs on each machine
will be automatically satisfied). We would like to use the algorithm from Theorem 5, but we would
need to run that algorithm for all values of x1, y1, x2, y2, which is not polynomial. The solution
is to rephrase the algorithm from Theorem 5 as an integer linear program with a fixed number of
variables (see Lemma 7 below), which we then combine with the equations involving x1, y1, x2, y2
above. This ILP can be solved in polynomial time by Lenstra [Len83].
General Case. Now let’s consider how to generalize the approach used in the example case to
the general case. Note that we can assume that Di ≤ α1k. Also note that if Di ≤ αCk, our new
requirement that machine i has at most k jobs follows from the old requirement that Di meets its
deadline.
Let m̂ be a constant such that if there are more than m̂ machines with deadline > αCk, we can
greedily schedule all jobs on these m̂ machines. (Since we can always schedule ⌊(αCk + 1)/α1⌋ jobs
on such a machine, such a constant exists.)
It remains therefore to look at the case where there are at most m̂ machines with deadline > αCk.
Without loss of generality, assume that the deadlines are in nonincreasing order and that we have
at least m̂ machines. Our case is solvable if and only if there exist xi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m̂ and 1 ≤ j ≤ C,
the number of jobs scheduled on machine i of length αj , such that
∑C
j=1 αjxi,j ≤ Di,
∑C
j=1 xi,j ≤ k,
and such that kmj−
∑m̂
i=1 xi,j jobs of length αj can be scheduled on m−m̂ machines with deadlines
Dm̂+1, . . . , Dm (since all these deadlines are ≤ αCk, the requirement that we schedule at most k jobs
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on each machine will be automatically satisfied). Use the ILP formulation of the algorithm from
Theorem 5 (see Lemma 7 below) to solve this last requirement and combine this with our equations
for xi,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m̂ and 1 ≤ j ≤ C, to obtain an ILP with a fixed number of variables, which can
be solved in polynomial time by Lenstra [Len83]. ❑
It remains to show that the algorithm from Theorem 5 can be rephrased as an integer linear
program with a fixed number of variables.
Lemma 7 For any fixed set of job lengths, there is an ILP with a fixed number of variables that
solves high-multiplicity scheduling on parallel machines with machine-dependent deadlines.
Proof. Let C be the number of job lengths and let ℓ1, . . . , ℓC be these job lengths. We are given
n1, . . . , nC , where ni is the number of jobs of length ℓi, and D1, . . . , Dm, where Di is the deadline
for machine i. In the proof of Theorem 5, we proved that this scheduling problem is in P using
dynamic programming. However, for the proof of Theorem 6 we need a different approach. Below
we present an ILP formulation with a fixed number of variables that computes if we can schedule
successfully that replaces the dynamic programming. Again, to show the essence of the argument,
we consider the case of C = 2, ℓ1 = 2, and ℓ2 = 3.
Look at a proof of Theorem 5 (the example case). We are already pretty close: We show that there
exist a1 and a2 such that a1 jobs of length 2 and a2 jobs of length 3 fit intoD1−D′1, D2−D
′
2, . . . , Dm−
D′m, n1−a1 is divisible by 3, n2−a2 is divisible by 2, and (n1−a1)/3+(n2−a2)/2 ≤ (D
′
1+· · ·+D
′
m)/6.
So all that is left to do is to write “a1 jobs of length 2 and a2 jobs of length 3 fit into D1 −
D′1, D2 −D
′
2, . . . , Dm −D
′
m” as an integer linear program with a fixed number of variables. Recall
that Di −D′i ≤ 12. For 0 ≤ j ≤ 12, let dj be the number of machines i such that Di −D
′
i = j.
Our integer linear program formulation is as follows. We introduce variables aj,(r,t) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 12
and 2r + 3t ≤ j. aj,(r,t) stands for the number of machines i such that Di − D
′
i = j and such
that Di − D′i is scheduled with r 2s and t 3s. For every j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 12, we have an equation∑
2r+3t≤j aj,(r,t) = dj and we add the following obvious equations:
∑
0≤j≤12,2r+3t≤j
aj,(r,t)r = a1.
∑
0≤j≤12,2r+3t≤j
aj,(r,t)t = a2.
It is easy to see that the example case generalizes to the general case, using the general case of the
proof of Theorem 5 ❑
5 Fixed Numbers of Candidates
It is reasonable to assume that the number of candidates in an election may be fixed. For weighted
voters many problems are hard, even when the number of candidates is fixed.
Theorem 8 1. m-candidate α-CWCM is NP-complete for every scoring rule α that is not plu-
rality or triviality [HH07].
2. m-candidate α-CCAV and m-candidate α-CCDV are each NP-complete for every scoring rule
α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉, when ‖{α1, . . . , αm}‖ ≥ 3, for weighted elections [FHH15].
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Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [FHH09] showed that high-multiplicity manipu-
lation for scoring rules is in P for any fixed number of candidates by describing an ILP with a fixed
number of variables.
Theorem 9 [FHH09] m-candidate α-CUCM is in P for every scoring rule α, for high-multiplicity
elections.
A similar approach can be used to show that high-multiplicity constructive control by
adding/deleting voters is in P for every scoring rule for a fixed number of candidates.
Theorem 10 m-candidate α-CCAV and m-candidate α-CCDV are each in P for every scoring rule
α = 〈α1, . . . , αm〉, for high-multiplicity elections.
Proof. Given a set of candidates C, a list of registered voters V in high-multiplicity representa-
tion, a list of unregistered voters U in high-multiplicity representation, an addition limit k ∈ N, and
a preferred candidate p ∈ C we can determine if the chair can ensure that p wins in polynomial time.
The argument closely follows the approach used by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaan-
dra [FHH09] to show that m-candidate α-bribery and m-candidate α-CUCM, for every scoring rule
α are each in P for high-multiplicity (there called succinct) elections.
We describe an integer linear program with a fixed number of variables, which due to the result
from Lenstra [Len83], can be solved in polynomial time.
Since the number of candidates m is fixed, we know that only m! different preference orders are
possible. We list these preference orders in order in the following way: o1, . . . , om!. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m!,
let ki be the number of voters in V with preference order oi, and let k
′
i be the number of voters in
U with preference order oi. Let x1, . . . , xm! be variables. The constants used as input to our linear
program are the coefficients of the scoring vector α1, . . . , αm, the counts for the registered voters
k1, . . . , km!, the counts for the unregistered voters k
′
1, . . . , k
′
m!, and the addition limit k. We have
the following constraints.
We first need to ensure that all of our variables have a nonnegative value. So, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!,
xi ≥ 0.
We also need to ensure that no more than the number of unregistered votes of each type are
added. So, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m!,
xi ≤ k
′
i.
The following constraint ensures that no more than k total votes are added.
m!∑
i=1
xi ≤ k.
Our final constraint ensures that no other candidate has a score greater than p. (Note that
pos(c, j) below denotes the position of candidate c in preference order oj .) So, for all c ∈ C − {p},
m!∑
j=1
αpos(p,j)(kj + xj) ≥
m!∑
j=1
αpos(c,j)(kj + xj).
It is easy to see that the above constraints are satisfied if and only if it is possible to add at most
k unregistered voters from U such that p wins.
The above integer linear program can be easily modified for the case of deleting voters. ❑
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6 Natural Increase in Complexity
In general, we find that the complexity of polynomial-time election problems in standard represen-
tation does not increase when moving to the high-multiplicity case. However, this does not mean
that such an increase is not possible. Recall the election system ExactlyHalfApproval defined in the
introduction.
Theorem 11 ExactlyHalfApproval-CCAC is in P and ExactlyHalfApproval-High-Multiplicity-
CCAC is NP-complete.
Proof. This problem is basically subset sum, which is in P for unary numbers and NP-complete
for binary numbers [GJ79]. To show that ExactlyHalfApproval-CCAC is in P, let s1, . . . , sm be the
approval scores of candidates c1, . . . , cm, let c1 be the preferred candidate and let c1, . . . , cℓ be the
registered candidates. We want to know if there exists a subset I of {ℓ + 1, . . . ,m} of size at most
k such that
2s1 =
∑
1≤i≤ℓ
si +
∑
i∈I
si.
This can easily be computed in polynomial time, using dynamic programming. Simply let, for all
ℓ + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ k′ ≤ k, 0 ≤ t ≤
∑
1≤i≤m si, S[i, t, k
′] = 1 if and only if there exists a size-k′
subset I of {ℓ+1, . . . ,m} such that
∑
1≤i≤ℓ si +
∑
i∈I si = t. This can be done in polynomial time,
since there are only polynomially many i, k′, and t to consider.
When the input is given in high-multiplicity representation, there are exponentially many values
for t possible. In this case, we can show that it is NP-complete. We reduce from Partition: Given
{k1, . . . , km} such that
∑
ki = 2K, we need to determine if a subset of these integers sums to K.
We have m+1 candidates, preferred candidate p and candidates c1, . . . , cm. We have K voters that
approve of only p, and ki voters that approve of only ci. p is the only registered voter and the
addition limit is m. It is immediate that there is a subset of k1, . . . , km that sums to K if and only
if p can be made a winner by adding candidates. ❑
Note that this complexity increase also holds for the weighted case, since for candidate control
problems, the weighted and high-multiplicity cases coincide (if their winner problems coincide, as
they typically do).
As mentioned in the introduction, this system is not particularly natural. We will now present
a natural case where the complexity increases, namely winner determination for Kemeny elections.
The Kemeny rule was introduced in [Kem59], and has several desirable properties [YL78]. A
candidate p is a Kemeny winner if p is ranked first in a Kemeny consensus, i.e., a linear order > over
the candidates that minimizes the Kendall tau distance to V , i.e., that minimizes
∑
a,b∈C,a>b ‖{v ∈
V | b >v a}‖, where >v is the preference order of voter v.
Observation 12 Kemeny-Weighted-Winner is equivalent to Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Winner.
Notice that the above observation holds since we do not modify the votes to score the election.
This is not the case for Dodgson and Young elections, which we discuss in Appendix A.2. Kemeny-
Winner was shown NP-hard in [BTT89] and Θp2-complete in [HSV05]. Θ
p
2-hardness was shown by
a chain of three reductions, ultimately showing that the Θp2-complete problem Min-Card-Vertex-
Cover-Compare reduces to Kemeny-Winner.
Footnote 3 in [HSV05] points out that Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Winner is in ∆p2 and explicitly
leaves the exact complexity of this problem as an open question. We will now show that Kemeny-
High-Multiplicity-Winner (and Kemeny-Weighted-Winner) are in fact ∆p2-complete. We define the
following ∆p2-complete weighted version of Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Compare.
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Name: Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare
Given: Vertex-weighted graphs G and H such that ω(G) = ω(H), where ω(G) denotes the weight
of the graph.4
Question: Is the weight of G’s minimum-weight vertex cover ≤ the weight of H ’s minimum-weight
vertex cover?
Lemma 13 Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare polynomial-time many-one reduces to Kemeny-
High-Multiplicity-Winner.
Proof. This follows by careful inspection and modification of the proof from Hemaspaandra,
Spakowski, and Vogel [HSV05] that Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Compare polynomial-time many-one
reduces to Kemeny-Winner. That proof consists of a chain of three reductions:
1. Min-Card-Vertex-Cover-Compare reduces to Vertex-Cover-Member.
2. Vertex-Cover-Member reduces to Feedback-Arc-Set-Member.
3. Feedback-Arc-Set-Member reduces to Kemeny-Winner.
Since that proof consists of a chain of three reductions between Θp2-complete problems, we need
to define suitable ∆p2-complete weighted versions of the two intermediate problems and show that
the weighted versions of the reductions still hold. In essence, we “lift” the constructions and proofs
from Θp2 to ∆
p
2. This works surprisingly smoothly.
We define the following weighted versions of the two intermediate problems.
Name: Weighted-Vertex-Cover-Member
Given: Vertex-weighted graph G and vertex v in G.
Question: Is v a member of a minimum-weight vertex cover of G?
Name: Weighted-Feedback-Arc-Set-Member
Given: Irreflexive and antisymmetric edge-weighted digraph G and vertex v in G.
Question: Is there a minimum-weight feedback arc set of G that contains all arcs entering v?
And we show the following.
1. Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare reduces to Weighted-Vertex-Cover-Member (Lemma 14).
2. Weighted-Vertex-Cover-Member reduces to Weighted-Feedback-Arc-Set-Member (Lemma 15).
3. Weighted-Feedback-Arc-Set-Member reduces to Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Winner
(Lemma 16).
This implies that Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare reduces to Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-
Winner. ❑
4Note that the weight of a vertex-weighted graph is the sum of the weights of each of its vertices.
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Lemma 14 Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare polynomial-time many-one reduces to Weighted-
Vertex-Cover-Member.
Proof. We extend the construction from Lemma 4.12 from [HSV05] to vertex-weighted graphs.
Given two vertex-weighted graphs G and H with ω(G) = ω(H), construct graph F as follows.
F = (G ∪ ({v}, ∅)) + (H ∪ ({w}, ∅)),5 keeping the weights of the vertices in G and H , and letting
ω(v) = ω(w) = 1. Map (G,H) to (F,w). Write mvc for the minimum vertex cover weight of a
vertex-weighted graph. We extend the argument from Lemma 4.12 from [HSV05] to show that this
mapping reduces Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare to Weighted-Vertex-Cover-Member.
Note that V is a vertex cover of F if and only if
1. V contains all vertices in G∪ ({v}, ∅) and a vertex cover of H . The lightest such vertex covers
have weight ω(G) + 1 +mvc(H) and do not contain w.
2. V contains all vertices in H ∪ ({w}, ∅) and a vertex cover of G. The lightest such vertex covers
have weight mvc(G) + ω(H) + 1 and contain w.
Since ω(G) = ω(H) it is immediate that mvc(G) ≤ mvc(H) if and only if there is a minimum-weight
vertex cover of F that contains w. ❑
Lemma 15 Weighted-Vertex-Cover-Member polynomial-time many-one reduces to Weighted-
Feedback-Arc-Set-Member.
Proof. We extend the construction from the proof of Lemma 4.8 from [HSV05], which itself is
an extension of the standard reduction from Vertex-Cover to Feedback-Arc-Set from [Kar72], to
graphs with weights. Given a vertex-weighted graph G, define edge-weighted digraph H = (W,A)
as follows.
1. W = {v, v′ | v ∈ V (G)}.
2. A consists of the following edges.
(a) For v ∈ V (G), edge (v, v′) with weight ω(v).
(b) For {v, w} ∈ E(G), edges (v′, w) and (w′, v) with weight ω(G).
The reduction maps (G, vˆ) to (H, vˆ′).
If V ′ is a vertex cover of G, then by the proof of Lemma 4.9 from [HSV05], {(v, v′) | v ∈ V ′}
is a feedback arc set for H . Note that the weight of this feedback arc set is ω(V ′) and that if V ′
contains vˆ, then {(v, v′) | v ∈ V ′} contains all arcs entering vˆ′.
Now suppose that A′ is a feedback arc set of H . Again by the proof of Lemma 4.9 from [HSV05],
V ′ = {v ∈ V (G) | ∃w ∈ W : (v, w) ∈ A′ or (v′, w) ∈ A′} forms a vertex cover of G. Note that
ω(V ′) ≤ ω(A′) (since for every v ∈ V ′, there exists a w ∈ W such that (v, w) ∈ A′ or (v′, w) in
A′ and each such edge contributes ω(v) or ω(G) to ω(A′)) and that if A′ contains (vˆ, vˆ′), then V ′
contains vˆ. ❑
Lemma 16 Weighted-Feedback-Arc-Set-Member polynomial-time many-one reduces to Kemeny-
High-Multiplicity-Winner.
5For two disjoint graphs G1 and G2, the join G1 + G2 is defined as follows: V (G1 + G2) = V (G1) ∪ V (G2) and
E(G1 +G2) = E(G1) ∪ E(G2) ∪ {{v, w} | v ∈ V (G1), w ∈ V (G2)}.
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Proof. We extend the construction from the proof of Lemma 4.2 of [HSV05] to graphs with
weights. Given an irreflexive and antisymmetric edge-weighted digraph G and vertex v in G, we first
multiply all edge weights by 2 (this does not change the membership of (G, v) in Weighted-Feedback-
Arc-Set-Member). We then use McGarvey’s construction [McG53] to construct in polynomial time
an election in high-multiplicity representation that has G as its weighted majority graph. The proof
of Lemma 4.2 of [HSV05] shows that there is a minimum-weight feedback arc set of G that contains
all arcs entering v if and only if v is a Kemeny winner of the constructed election. ❑
This completes the proof of Lemma 13. To prove the main theorem of this section it remains to
show the following lemma.
Lemma 17 Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare is ∆p2-hard.
Proof. For a formula φ(x1, . . . , xn), we view an assignment for φ as the n-bit string α1 · · ·αn such
that αi gives the assignment for variable xi. We identify α with the binary number (between 0 and
2n − 1) that it represents. [HHR14] shows that it is ∆p2-hard to compare the maximal satisfying
assignments of two cnf formulas. By negating the variables in the formulas, we obtain the following
∆p2-hard promise problem, which we will reduce to Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare to prove
Lemma 17.
Name: MINSATASG≤
Given: Two satisfiable 3cnf formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn).
Question: Is the minimal satisfying assignment of φ ≤ the minimal satisfying assignment of ψ?
Let φ(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be two satisfiable 3cnf formulas. Without loss of generality,
assume that φ and ψ have the same number m of clauses (simply pad).
Let f(φ) be the graph computed by the standard reduction from 3SAT to Vertex-Cover
from [Kar72]. Then f(φ) consists of 2n+ 3m vertices: {xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {ai, bi, ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ m},
and the following edges: {xi, xi} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, {aj, bj}, {aj, cj}, and {bj, cj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and
if the jth clause in φ is ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3, where ℓr ∈ {xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we have edges {aj , ℓ1},
{bj, ℓ2}, {cj , ℓ3}.
The properties of f that we need here, which follow immediately from the proof of [Kar72], are
as follows.
1. f(φ) does not have a vertex cover of size less than n+ 2m.
2. If W is a vertex cover of size n+2m, then W ∩{xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to a satisfying
assignment of φ, in the sense that ‖W ∩ {xi, xi}‖ = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and α1 · · ·αn defined as
αi = 1 if and only if xi ∈ W is a satisfying assignment for φ.
3. If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then there is a vertex cover of size n + 2m such that
W ∩{xi, xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} corresponds to this assignment, i.e., the set {xi | αi = 1}∪{xi | αi = 0}
can be extended to a vertex cover of size n+ 2m by adding 2m vertices from {ai, bi, ci | 1 ≤
i ≤ m}.
Now set the weights of the vertices as follows: ω(ai) = ω(bi) = ω(ci) = 2
n, ω(xi) = 2
n+2n−i, and
ω(xi) = 2
n. Note that for W a set of vertices, ‖W‖ = ⌊ω(W )/2n⌋. In particular, a minimum-weight
vertex cover will also have minimum size.
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We will now show that n-bit string α is the smallest satisfying assignment of φ if and only if
f(φ) has a minimum-weight vertex cover of weight (n+ 2m)2n + α. (Recall that we interpret n-bit
string α as a binary number between 0 and 2n − 1.)
If α is a satisfying assignment for φ, then by property 3 above the set {xi | αi = 1}∪{xi | αi = 0}
can be extended to a vertex cover of size n+2m by adding 2m vertices from {ai, bi, ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}.
The weight of this vertex cover is (n+2m)2n+α. Since the minimum size of a vertex cover is n+2m,
the weight of a minimum-weight vertex cover is (n+ 2m)2n + β, for some β such that 0 ≤ β < 2n.
Such a β corresponds to a satisfying assignment by property 2 above.
Since ψ is also a satisfiable 3cnf formula over x1, . . . , xn with m clauses, it also holds that n-bit
string α is the smallest satisfying assignment of ψ if and only if f(ψ) has a minimum weight vertex
cover of weight (n+ 2m)2n + α.
This then implies that φ’s minimal satisfying assignment is ≤ ψ’s minimal satisfying assignment
if and only if the weight of f(φ)’s minimum-weight vertex cover is less than or equal to the weight of
f(ψ)’s minimum-weight vertex cover. Note that ω(f(φ)) = ω(f(ψ)). This completes the reduction
from MINSATASG≤ to Min-Weight-Vertex-Cover-Compare. ❑
This completes the proof of the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 18 Kemeny-Weighted-Winner and Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Winner are ∆p2-complete.
Dwork et al. [DKNS01] show that Kemeny-Winner is already NP-hard for four voters. In fact,
one can easily combine the techniques from Hemaspaandra, Spakowski, and Vogel [HSV05] and
Dwork et al. [DKNS01] to obtain the following theorem. For details, see the appendix.
Theorem 19 Kemeny-Winner for four voters is Θp2-complete.
Do we get the same complexity jump from Θp2-complete to ∆
p
2-complete if we look at the high-
multiplicity (or weighted) case for four votes? Note that in the high-multiplicity case we allow many
voters with the same vote, and so the Kendall tau distance of a linear order > over the candidates
to the set of voters can be large. However, even though the distances can be large, it is easy to
see that there are only a polynomial number of possibilities. Namely, if the multiplicities of the
four votes are k1, k2, k3, and k4, the only possible distances are ℓ1k1 + ℓ2k2 + ℓ3k3 + ℓ4k4, where
0 ≤ ℓi ≤ ‖C‖(‖C‖ − 1)/2. Consider the following problem
Name: Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Score
Given: An election (C, V ) in high-multiplicity representation, candidate c ∈ C, an integer k.
Question: Does there exist a linear order > over the candidates such that c is ranked first and the
Kendall tau distance of > to V is at most k?
It is easy to see that Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Score is in NP. Now for each candidate c, simply
query the Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Score oracle for all possible distances in parallel, and then
determine whether p is a winner.
Theorem 20 Kemeny-Weighted-Winner and Kemeny-High-Multiplicity-Winner for four votes are
Θp2-complete.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
High-multiplicity representation is a very natural way to represent an election. This representation
may be exponentially smaller than the standard representation and so we would expect to see an
increase in complexity (with respect to the length of the input). However, we were able to either
adapt the approaches used for standard representation or provide new algorithms to show that
polynomial-time election problems generally remain in P. We also explored the relationship between
high-multiplicity scheduling and manipulation of high-multiplicity elections, which led to a new
result in scheduling.
There are several interesting directions for future work. Is it possible for a high-multiplicity
election problem to be harder than the corresponding weighted problem? Can we find natural cases,
for election problems as well as for scheduling problems, where the complexity increases from P to
NP-hard when going to high-multiplicity representation?
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 19: Kemeny-Winner for four voters is Θ
p
2-
complete.
We combine the constructions from [HSV05] and [DKNS01], to reduce Feedback-Arc-Set-Member
to Kemeny-Winner for four voters.
Given an irreflexive and antisymmetric digraph G = (V,A) and vertex v ∈ V , we first
compute graph G′ as done in [DKNS01]. G′ = (V ′, A′) such that V ′ = V ∪ A and A′ =
{(v, (v, w)), ((v, w), w) | (v, w) ∈ A}. Note that G has a feedback arc set of size k if and only if
G′ has a feedback arc set of size k. In addition, and important for our proof, (G, v) is in Feedback-
Arc-Set-Member if and only if (G′, v) is in Feedback-Arc-Set-Member. Also note that G′ is irreflexive
and antisymmetric. Now apply the reduction from Feedback-Arc-Set-Member to Kemeny-Winner
from [HSV05] on (G′, v). This reduction outputs an election g(G′) that corresponds to G′ and
(G′, v) is in Feedback-Arc-Set-Member if and only if (g(G′), v) is in Kemeny-Winner. The construc-
tion from [DKNS01] shows that we need only four voters in g(G′).
A.2 Dodgson and Young Elections
In Section 6 we consider the complexity of winner determination for Kemeny elections. In this section
we consider the complexity of winner determination for Dodgson [Dod76] and for Young [You77],
which as with Kemeny, is Θp2-complete for standard representation [HHR97, RSV03]. The Dodgson
score of a candidate c is the number of swaps between adjacent candidates needed in the preferences
of the voters in the election to make c a Condorcet winner (a candidate that beats each other
candidate pairwise). The Dodgson winner(s) of an election are the candidate(s) with minimum
score. The Young score of a candidate c is the size of a largest subcollection of voters for which c is a
weak Condorcet winner (a candidate that beats-or-ties each other candidate pairwise). The Young
winner(s) of an election are the candidate(s) with maximum score.
For Young and Dodgson for weighted elections we can consider both the case where we charge
by the voter (e.g., for Dodgson the score is based on the number of swaps regardless of the weight of
the voters where candidates are swapped) and the case where we charge by the voter-weight (e.g.,
21
for Dodgson a swap in the vote of a weight ω voter counts as ω swaps). Clearly, by brute-force, we
have the following.6
Theorem 21 For a fixed number of voters, Young-Weighted-Winner and Dodgson-Weighted-
Winner are in P, both in the model where we charge by the voter and in the model where we charge
by the voter-weight.
The high-multiplicity case for Young is also in P, but this seems to need much more powerful
machinery.
Theorem 22 For a fixed number of votes, Young-High-Multiplicity-Winner is in P.
Proof. Given an election (C, V ) in high-multiplicity representation and a candidate p, we can
determine if p is a Young winner in the following way.
First, consider the following ILP that determines if the Young score of a candidate c is ≥ a given
k. Let v1, . . . , vℓ be the distinct votes in V . The ILP has variables k1, . . . , kℓ that correspond to the
number of voters “kept” for each vote and the following constraints.
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, ki ≥ 0 (1)
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, ki ≤ κ(vi) (2)
ℓ∑
i=1
ki ≥ k (3)
∀a 6= c,
∑
1≤i≤ℓ,c>ia
ki ≥
∑
1≤i≤ℓ,a>ic
ki (4)
Constraints 1, 2, and 3 ensure that the number of voters kept for each vote is consistent with
the given election and that the total number of voters kept is at least k. Constraint 4 ensures that
c is a weak Condorcet winner.
We can then determine if a candidate p is a Young winner by separately computing the Young
score of each candidate using the ILP described above (which can be solved in polynomial time
by Lenstra [Len83]) and binary search, and p is a winner if and only if p has maximum Young
score. ❑
This case of a fixed number of votes is a natural case to consider, since this models scenarios where
all voters aligning with the same political party or group may vote the same. This is reminiscent to
related work where the preferences of the voters are single-peaked (and so only a restricted number
of the total possible votes occur) (see, e.g., [FHHR11]), but instead we restrict the number of votes
in an election without assuming structure among them.
For the general weighted cases where we charge by the voter, it is easy to see that the scores are
polynomially bounded, and so we can state the following result.
Theorem 23 Young-Weighted-Winner and Dodgson-Weighted-Winner in the model where we
charge by the voter are Θp2-complete.
6Note that to compute the Dodgson score for a given candidate c it suffices to consider only swaps that move c
up. So for each voter we only have to look at a linear number of possibilities (depending only on the position of c).
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It is easy to see that Young-Weighted-Winner and Dodgson-Weighted-Winner in the model
where we charge by voter-weight as well as Young-High-Multiplicity-Winner and Dodgson-High-
Multiplicity-Winner are in ∆p2, by using binary search to find the scores of all candidates.
We conjecture that, as in the case for Kemeny, we can “lift” the Θp2-hardness proofs for Dodgson
and Young to ∆p2-hardness proofs for the weighted cases. We do not think that this “lifting” will
work for the high-multiplicity cases and leave the exact complexity of these problems, which we
know to be Θp2-hard and in ∆
p
2, as an open question.
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